In this paper, we propose an efficient mechanism dealing with trust assessment for agent societies, aiming to accurately 
Introduction
Over the past couple of years, agent communication languages and protocols have been of much interest in multiagent systems. In such systems, autonomous agents are distributed in large scale network and mutually interact to collaborate, coordinate and share resources with each other. Therefore, trust is essential in effective interactions within open multi-agent systems [2] , [1] , [16] , [8] , [12] . Generally, an agent's trust in another is defined as the measure of willingness that the agent will make what he agrees to do. Attempting to maintain a trust-based network, different frameworks have been proposed in literature regarding to assess the trust agents have in one another. The most recent research areas in trust models are as follows: a) trust based on the direct interaction done between two parties [15] , [14] ; b) trust based on prior interactions [4] , [5] ; c) witness reputation, which is based on the reports provided by the third parties [11] , [7] , [13] ; and d) certified reputation which is based on the certified reports provided by the agent being evaluated [2] , [4] .
In the proposed frameworks, generally the objective is to perform accurate trust assessment. But since agents are self-interested, it is hard to analyze an agent's likely behavior based on previous direct interactions. Moreover, the collected information from other agents may be unreliable and could lead to a non-accurate trust assessment. The main problem of these frameworks is that they do not act properly when selfish agents tend to change their behaviors. Therefore, they do not recognize the recent improvement or degradation in particular agent's capabilities. Considering these limitations, the trust models are aimed to act more precisely in terms of assessment and be adaptive to the environment inconsistency.
In this paper, we present an efficient assessment process for trust in a twofold contribution: on-line and off-line. In the first contribution, agents mutually interact and rate each other based on the interaction done (either satisfactory or dissatisfactory). The obtained ratings are accumulated to assess the direct interaction rating of a particular agent. Inter-agent communication is regulated by protocols (shared amongst agents and thus public) and determined by strategies (internal to agents and thus private). Upon evaluating an unknown (or not very well known) agent (so called the trustee), the evaluator agent (so called the trustor) is able to ask others (so called consulting agents) about their direct interaction ratings with the trustee agent. The consulting agents are composed of trustworthy agents (known by the trustor agent) and referee agents (introduced by the trustee agent), illustrated in figure 1. In the proposed framework, the trustor agent evaluates the credibility of the trustee by combining his own direct trust rating by the ratings provided by the consulting agents. The suggestions provided by the consulting agents are partially considered with respect to their time recency, interaction strengthen and accuracy. Taking these features into account, we represent a more accurate trust assessment. In the second contribution of this paper, the trustor agent after a period of direct interaction with the trustee agent performs an off-line assessment in order to adjust the credibility of the consulting agents (trustworthy and referee agents) that provided information regarding to the trust level of the trustee agent.
Compared to existing trust models for agent-based computing, our model is the first one equipped with this off-line Figure 1 . Overall trustworthy and referee agents protocol topology.
evaluation, which constitutes the maintenance process. In this process, the suggestions provided by consulting agents are compared with the observed behavior of the trustee agent. Exceeding some predefined thresholds, the trustor agent would either increase or decrease his belief about consulting agents. Doing so, gradually agents recognize more reliable consulting agents around in the network, which would cause a more efficient trust assessment process in future. Therefore, in our proposed model, agents would adapt themselves with new situations. In terms of game theoretical and mechanism design analysis [9] , our model has the advantage of providing an incentive to the consultant agents, that are rational, to encourage them to reveal the truth when they send their ratings about other agents. Simply put, the incentive is computed in the off-line process in terms of increasing or decreasing the consultant's credibility according to the distance between the trustor's actual behavior and the revealed information by the consultants. In this paper, we analyze the effect of the maintenance process in different points of views and we compare the system efficiency with some other models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the on-line trust assessment process of our framework, which is composed of direct and indirect evaluation. In Section 3, we discuss the maintenance that a typical agent makes after a certain amount of time, since the interactions initiated. In Section 4, we outline the properties of our model in the experimental environment, represent the testbed, and compare our model results with two well-known trust models in terms of efficiency in trust assessment. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
On-line Trust Estimation
In this section, we discuss the on-line evaluation process, in which the trustor agent collects some information and combines them to assess the credibility of the trustee agent. On-line evaluation is a twofold approach. In the former approach, the trustor only relies on what he has from his previous interactions with the trustee agent. In this case the number of interactions and the time recency of them would be considered (Section 2.1). In the later approach, the trustor prefers relying on the information provided by some other agents to assess a more accurate credibility for the trustee agent. Therefore, a number of consulting agents are to be selected, their credibility and the coherence of the information they provide is analyzed. We discuss these in depth in Section 2.2.
Direct Trust Evaluation
If the agents in the system know each other, this means they had a prior interaction history and consequently can compute the trust value of each other directly. Using their reasoning capabilities, agents evaluate the outcomes of their interactions. In the general case, they can evaluate these outcomes according to a scale of n types numbered from 1 (the most successful outcome) to n (the less successful outcome), such that the first m outcome types (m < n) are considered successful. Let NI i
Ag b
Aga be the number of interactions of type i that the trustor Ag a had with the trustee Ag b . Then, the trustor's estimated trust value for the trustee, T r
Aga can be computed by equation 1 as the ratio of the "number of successful outcomes" to the "total number of possible outcomes":
where w i is the weight associated to the interaction type i and the v ij is the measure taken into account in order to avoid two transactions with different values being treated equally (i.e. transactions with cost of $100, 000 and $100). The weight w i is application dependant and allows giving more importance to some interaction types than others. For example, considering the very successful interactions more important than the successful ones. In this particular case, agents will gain more trust by performing very good interactions (for example providing very good services). The factor v ij is used to protect the model from attacks like reputation squeeze [3] in which one agent would obtain some positive ratings and make a bad interaction which actually makes a large damage.
In addition to the wight and measure of the interactions, another factor is used to reflect the timely relevance of these interactions. Since agents act in an environment, which is dynamic and may change quickly, it is more desirable to promote recent information and deal with out-of-date information with less emphasis. In our model, we assess this factor denoted by T iR(Δt 
T iR(Δt
Aga is the time difference between the current time and the time at which Ag a updates his information about Ag b 's trust (the interaction time). The intuition behind this formula is to use a function decreasing with the time difference. Consequently, the more recent the information is, the higher the timely relevance coefficient would be. Variable λ is an application-dependent coefficient. In some applications, recent interactions are more desirable to be considered. In that case, the trustor uses a higher value for λ to judge the credibility of the trustee. In contrast, in some other applications, even the old interactions are still valuable source of information. In that case, the trustor sets a relatively smaller value to λ. Considering the involved issues, we advance the equation 1 to the following to denote the direct trust estimation of a trustor agent Ag a regarding to a trustee agent Ag b based on interaction history between them:
Indirect Trust Evaluation
The second approach in on-line trust estimation of the trustee agent is to collect some information in terms of suggestions from some other agents. As indicated before, the consulting agents are divided into two groups: (1) the trustworthy agents, that the trustor agent Ag a can rely on to request for information about the trustee Ag b ; and (2) the referee agents, that are introduced by the trustee agent as recommenders. In this section, we address the selection process of the consulting agents and how to deal with the information they provide in support of Ag b .
Let T
Ag b
Aga be the set of trustworthy agents that Ag a knows from his belief set and that can report on Ag b . Depending on the situation, how much Ag a is aware of his surrounding environment and how restrictive Ag a needs to be in consulting selection, a predefined trustworthy selection threshold (μ T ) is supposed to set in order to select a required number of trustworthy agents and fill the selected trustworthy set T s
Aga . Basically, the elements of this set are the agents that are going to be asked about the credibility of the trustee Ag b . 
After selecting the proper consulting agents to ask about Ag b , Ag a asks each one of them about the rating he can provide. In the proposed framework, the obtained suggestions are partially considered in the total trust evaluation done by Ag a . The first restriction factor is the time recency, which the affect is discussed in section 2.1 and derived from equation 2. The second restriction factor is denoted as the relation strengthen. We discuss its affect and how it is derived in the following. Let NI Agy Agx be the total number of interactions between two agents Ag x and Ag y , which is computed by the equation 4 where n is the total number of outcome types.
NIi
Agy Agx (4) The total number of interactions between trustworthy agents Ag t (resp. referee agents Ag r ) and the trustee Ag b , NI
Agr ) is an important factor because it promotes information coming from agents knowing more about Ag b . Generally, the agents that had high number of interactions with Ag b are considered as good sources of information. The third factor considered by our trust model is the trustworthiness of the consulting agents. Considering his belief, Ag a assigns a trust value for each consulting agent and thus restricts their contribution with respect to their relative trust value.
The trustor Ag a derives the total trust estimation regarding to Ag b using equation 5.
T r
where
This equation takes into account the aforementioned factors, which are categorized as follows: (1) 
Because of space limit, we have only defined the measure functions Ω T and Ω T , which are related to the trustworthy agents, and Ω R and Ω R are set likewise.
Following the ideology that Ag a could to some extent rely on his own history interaction with Ag b (direct trust evaluation approach) and partially use the second approach which is consulting other agents, Ag a gives a 100% trustworthy rate (T r Aga Aga = 1) to his history and considers himself as a member of his trustworthy community. This merging method takes into account the proportional relevance of each trust assessment, rather than treating them separately. Basically, the contribution percentage of each approach in the final evaluation of T r
Ag b
Aga is defined regarding to how informative the history is in terms of the number of direct interactions between Ag a and Ag b and their time recency. Therefore, consultation with other agents is more considered if the history reflects lower uncertainty. Respectively, the higher uncertainty of the history makes the trustor uncertain and thus rely less on that history. Hence, consultation with other agents should be considered.
Generally, the second evaluation approach (consulting with others) is combined with the first evaluation approach (checking self history) to end up with an accurate trust estimation of the trustor agent Ag a for the trustee agent Aga ). To this end, we have a retrospect trust evaluation which is represented in Section 3.
Off-line Trust Estimation

Formulation
In the off-line trust evaluation we try to minimize the adverse affects the consulting agents may cause. For instance, two agents that have a strong relationship can support each other in trust evaluation and overestimate their trust level when they have been introduced as referee agents. That implicitly means Ag a can expect more accurate suggestion from a consulting agent that had a large number of interactions with Ag b comparing to the consulting agent who had less. Respectively, these agents should be affected more when the opposite of their suggestions turned out to be true. Generally, Ag a is more confident about his trustworthy agents as they have shown an acceptable trustworthiness so far, but the referee agents are chosen by Ag b , so we should always consider the possibilities like the cooperating partners may vote in favor of each other or competing agents may underrate their opponents. Therefore, Ag a after a period of interacting with Ag b performs maintenance in order to evaluate the accuracy of consulting agents' reports and therefore modify his belief about those agents' trust level. In addition, in evaluation process done by Ag a , maybe there were some referee agents involved in, but their suggestions were not considered as they were not known by Ag a . Consequently, these agents are not eligible to contribute in the trust evaluation process, but Ag a does not discard their suggestions. This set of referee agents is denoted by Ro
Ag b
Aga . After the maintenance, Ag a would be able to estimate such referee agents' credibility as long as they are known (because of their referee history) by Ag a from now on. To get into the maintenance procedure, we need to define some parameters in the following paragraphs.
Considering Ag a as the trustor and Ag b as the trustee, let C Agi be the overall Ag i 's contribution in the trust evaluation of T r
Aga . This contribution is defined as follows:
Consequently, the percentage contribution of each consulting agent Ag i would be computed as follows:
Let PC be the mean value of PC Agi defined as follows:
Ag b Aga
Rs
Ag b Aga
Also, let T s Aga represent the set of trustworthy and referee agents, which perform high contribution. We define these sets as follows: Aga be the set containing all the agents that are to be involved in the maintenance process, which is defined as follows: Agi ). Therefore, thresholds ν T and ν R are associated as inaccuracy tolerance thresholds for the trustworthy and referee agents. We assign two different thresholds because the referee agents were supposed to deliver a more accurate information about Ag b comparing to the trustworthy agents because they have been introduced by Ag b . By doing so, if the difference is greater than the associated threshold for the agent, the consulting agent's trust level should be dropped to some extent, otherwise it will be enhanced regarding to the importance of suggestion provided. The incremental rate φ i is defined by Ag a . The trustworthiness level of the agent Ag i is defined by the following equation:
The value D i defines the inaccuracy of the trust level regarding to the specific consulting agent Ag i . The inaccuracy is checked by the predefined threshold (here for referee agents ν R and respectively for the trustworthy agents, ν T would be used) to recognize whether the referee agent's suggestion was apart from the real value. If the inaccuracy is less than the predefined threshold, Ag a increases the current trust level of Ag i . Since the increment should not exceed 1, φ i is used to be the decrease in the difference between the current trust value and 1. Indeed, decreasing the difference makes the trust value increase. The value φ i , decreases regarding to the portion of the number of interactions done between the trustor Ag a , the consulting agent Ag i and the trustee Ag b .
Off-line as an Optimization Problem
Strictly speaking, the objective of off-line process is to get the most accurate evaluation possible. This can be formalized as an optimization problem. In this problem we try to minimize the difference of the estimated trust and the observed value by changing the trust values provided by the consulting agents. These changes should respect the awards and penalties that the trustor agent would like to apply to some of the consulting agents. Therefore we define new constraints associated to each consulting agent that make such restrictions in the sense that after minimization, the consulting agents that are supposed to get higher trust value, cannot get decreased. Likewise the agents that are supposed to get less trust value, cannot get increased.
To define these constraints, let us first define the following vectors. Let T r Aga as the vector of measures involved when computing the contribution of consulting agents in trust evaluation of Ag b , except Ag a 's trust rate for the consulting agents. We note that each measure CM Agi (each element of the vector) remains fixed in the maintenance process. Therefore, we have separated it from the partial rate considered by the trustee agent for the consulting agent Ag i . The measure is derived as follows:
The vector T r
Ag b
Aga is subject to change in the minimization function when resolving the optimization problem. For that reason, we save a copy of T r Aga . The underlying constraints of the optimization problem would be obtained as follows:
where: Agi are assumed to be constant. Therefore, by the information provided, the vector T r
Aga denotes the partial ratings of consulting agents. Respecting the direction of possible change for each agent, now we are able to perform a maintenance step in order to minimize the error of the combined partial ratings. To minimize the total error, we perform one iteration of the steepest descent minimization method to get the appropriate direction towards the minimum, together with the proper step size for updating the Aga . Doing this, we obtain the best sequence of ratings that could have been assigned by Ag a to the consulting agents in the sense that the difference of the estimated trust (T r The updated sequence of rates are assumed to be the best values the consulting agents could provide during the specific time period considered for the maintenance. Although these updates respect the derived constraints, there might be some anomalies in the sense that some particular consulting agents (most likely some with intermittent behavior) may get increased of their rates by some values while they actually do not deserve. These anomalies would be recovered by the consequent maintenance processes, which the trustor agent would make. This is because the intermittent behavior of those agent would affect the overcoming maintenance procedure, which may eventually cause the right direction of trust adjustment. Hence, by the consequent updates the trustor agent performs, he rates in such a way that the trust value of the consulting agents approach their actual behavior.
Experimental Results
In this section we describe the implementation of a proof of concept prototype. We also compare our proposed model with Travos [13] and BRS [7] trust models. In the implemented prototype, agents are implemented as Jadex c T M agents, i.e. they inherit from the basic class Jadex − Simulator c T M Agent. The agent reasoning capabilities are implemented as Java modules using logic programming techniques. The testbed environment (represented in table 1) is populated with two agent types: (1) service provider agents that are supposed to provide services (toward simplicity, we assume only one type of service is provided and therefore consumed); and (2) service consumer agents (equipped with the different trust models) that are seeking the service providers to interact with and consume the provided service.
The simulation consists of a number of consequent RUNs in which agents are activated and build their private knowledge and keep interacting with one another, gain utility and enhance their overall knowledge about the environment. Table 1 represents four types of the service providers we consider in our simulation: good, ordinary, bad and fickle. The first three provide the service regarding to the assigned mean value of quality with a small range of deviation. But fickle providers are more flexible as their range of quality covers the whole possible outcomes. To put the system in a more tight situation and make it open, we use high number of fickle agents and a certain number of agents to enter and leave to start interacting and thus, build their environment. Upon initiation of the simulation, some agents are initialized with some random parameters. However, some other agents and the ones that join the system within RUNs, are the agents that do not know any agent in the surrounding environment. These agents start interacting with their adjacent agents in order to build their connections to their surrounding network. After gaining enough connections, obviously they restrict their connectivity by evaluating the interacting agents. Due to space limit, we do not elaborate such scenarios. In this section, we compare the proposed model with Travos and BRS concerning how they survive in biased environment where agents constantly change their behaviors. Travos and BRS trust models differ from ours in the trust assessment mechanism and analysis they perform in order to choose the best possible provider. Therefore the utility gained by each model is considered as its efficiency in selecting reliable service providers. The experimental measurements of the comparison between these models are outlined in table 2. Travos and BRS are similar to the proposed model in the sense that they do consider other agents' suggestions while evaluating the trust in some specific agent and discard inaccurate suggestions aiming to adapt themselves to the environment inconsistency attitude. In BRS, the trustor agent evaluates the recommender agents' suggestions using beta distribution method and ignores the suggestions that deviate the most from the majority of the ratings. Concerning this, BRS is comparatively a static trust method, which causes a low-efficient performance in very dynamic and biased environments like open multi-agent systems. Cumulative gained utility vs. number of runs graph is shown in figure 2. This model is not sensitive to an agile behavior change. This means that if a BRS agent decides to evaluate an agent that he is not acquainted with, he considers the majority of ratings, which are supposed to be truthfully revealed about the trustee agent. In such a case that the trustee agent is just changed his strategy, the trustor agent would loose in trust assessment and does not maintain any action to verify the accuracy of the gained information. It may take as much time that other agents perform a number of direct interactions to start rating about the spurious trustee agent. Therefore, as illustrated in figure 4 , the BRS agents would have higher percentage of fickle providers selection and relatively less percentage of good providers selection (illustrated in figure  3 ). Generally, it would take more time for BRS agents to adapt themselves to the new environment conditions. merges his own experience with recommendations from other agents. However, unlike BRS model, Travos filters the surrounding agents that are fluctuating in their reports about a specific trustee agent. To some extent, this feature would cause a partial suggestion consideration and thus, Travos agents would learn faster comparing to BRS agents. Rates concerning the good and fickle selection percentage shown in figures 3 and 4 reflect higher efficiency of Travos compared to BRS. Travos agents are capable of preventing the concept of fake reputation in which a group of agents artificially increase their reputation by their collusive behaviors. However, Travos model considers that agents do not change their behavior towards the elapsing time. These missing assumptions affect the accuracy of trust estimation in a very biased environment. On the other hand, lack of agile learning ability for agents will weaken the protection against collusion and fake behaviors. This is the case when a surrounding agent is being discarded because of providing diverse reports about a particular trustee agent. In this case, the deviation would be filtered by mistake if the reports are reflecting the fickle attitude of that particular provider. In the proposed model we tried to improve the trust mechanism to recover these limitations that enable agents to adapt themselves while the environment is strictly intermittent. In our model agents update their beliefs about the quality of the service together with the accuracy of the ratings provided by the neighbor agents in support or against the specific provider. Considering all the involved parameters, the agent that is doing maintenance, balances his beliefs to be more accurate in terms of knowing the best provider and the best neighbors that can consult. Therefore, as shown in figure 2 , the proposed model would gain more utility comparing to the other two models. Figures 3 and 4 reflect our model agile reaction to increase its good selection percentage very fast and thus decrease its fickle selection percentage the most possible.
Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is the proposition of a new probabilistic-based trust model for agent-based computing. The trust assessment procedure is composed of on-line and off-line evaluation processes. On-line approach is based on consulting agents presented as well as several other features in order to enhance the accuracy for agents to make use of the information communicated to them. Offline process considers the communicated information to judge the accuracy of the consulting agents in the previous on-line trust assessment process. This process is incentive compatible in terms of game theory and mechanism design.
Our model has the advantage of being computationally efficient as it takes into account the important factors involved in the trust assessment process. Moreover, extra process of maintenance enables agents to dynamically adjust their beliefs, and consequently update their trustworthy community in a more efficient manner. The proposed mechanism efficiency is compared with other related models and discussed in details to prove the capabilities of the proposed model. In this paper, the size of the simulation environment is not taken into account as an issue. However, the scalably of the proposed model is subject to be analyzed in huge networks. Our objective for future work is to advance the assessment model to enhance the model efficiency and we would like to analyze such efficiency in large-scale networks. In the offline process, we need to elaborate more on the optimization part, trying to formulate it in the sense to be adaptable to diverse situations. Finally, we plan to further the analysis in comparison with other models in order to capture more results reflecting the proposed model capabilities.
